Origins of the Cold War (1945-1947)

The Cold War did not begin with a single shot or declaration. It emerged gradually from the ashes of World War II, as the Grand Alliance against Germany disintegrated into bitter rivalry.

The conflict began as both powers sought to expand their influence. The U.S. pursued a policy of containment to stop the spread of communism, while the Soviet Union established control over Eastern Europe.

In just two years, from February 1945 to March 1947, the United States and Soviet Union transformed from partners in victory into leaders of opposing global blocs.

This article examines the critical moments that created the Cold War: the conferences where trust broke down, the speeches that defined new doctrines, and the policies that institutionalized confrontation. Understanding these origins is essential for comprehending the four decades of conflict that followed.

The Yalta Conference on the Crimean Peninsula represented the final meeting of the "Big Three", Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin. The setting itself carried symbolic weight: the Livadia Palace, last residence of Tsar Nicholas II before the Russian Revolution, now hosted leaders discussing Europe's postwar future.

Agreements at Yalta

The conference produced several key agreements that would shape the postwar order:

• United Nations: Stalin agreed to Soviet participation in the new international organization, including membership on the Security Council.

• Germany: Agreement on unconditional surrender, occupation zones, and denazification.

• Poland: The most contentious issue, Stalin insisted on a pro-Soviet government, while Roosevelt and Churchill pushed for free elections.

• Far East: Secret agreement for Soviet entry into the war against Japan within three months of Germany's defeat.

Seeds of Discord

Despite optimistic public statements, Yalta revealed fundamental disagreements. Roosevelt, gravely ill and focused on securing Soviet participation in the United Nations, made concessions on Eastern Europe that Churchill opposed. The "Declaration on Liberated Europe" promised free elections, but Stalin interpreted this loosely, guaranteeing pro-Soviet governments in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The atomic bomb, still under development, cast a shadow over proceedings. Roosevelt casually mentioned "a new weapon" to Stalin, who showed little reaction, Soviet intelligence had already penetrated the Manhattan Project. But the bomb's eventual use would fundamentally alter the superpower balance.

By the time the "Big Three" met again at Potsdam, the context had transformed completely. Germany had surrendered. Roosevelt had died on April 12, succeeded by the less diplomatic Harry S. Truman. Churchill attended the opening sessions but was replaced by Clement Attlee on July 28 after losing the British general election.

New Leaders, New Tensions

Truman, who had been Vice President for only 82 days before Roosevelt's death, approached Soviet relations with a harder edge than his predecessor. On July 16, the day before the conference opened, American scientists successfully tested the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Truman received news of the "Trinity" test during the conference, strengthening his negotiating position.

The Potsdam Agreements

The conference produced the Potsdam Agreement governing Germany's occupation:

• Division into four zones (American, British, French, Soviet)

• Berlin, deep inside the Soviet zone, would also be divided

• Demilitarization, denazification, democratization, and decartelization ("4 Ds")

• Soviet reparations from their zone and 25% of industrial equipment from western zones

But disagreements festered beneath the surface. Truman resisted Soviet demands for massive reparations that would cripple German recovery. Stalin insisted on pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Europe. The "percentages agreement" Churchill had negotiated with Stalin in 1944, dividing spheres of influence in the Balkans, was never acknowledged by Truman.

The Atomic Shadow

Truman casually mentioned to Stalin that the United States possessed "a new weapon of unusual destructive force." Stalin, who knew of the bomb through espionage, showed little reaction. But the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, while the conference was technically still in session, profoundly shaped Soviet security calculations.

On February 22, 1946, George F. Kennan, the 42-year-old chargé d'affaires at the American embassy in Moscow, sent an 8,000-word telegram to Washington that would define American Cold War strategy. Responding to a routine Treasury Department query about why the Soviets were blocking international financial institutions, Kennan produced the most influential single document of the Cold War's origins.

Kennan's Analysis

The "Long Telegram" argued that Soviet behavior was not primarily responsive to Western actions but driven by internal ideological and historical necessities:

Kennan identified several key sources of Soviet conduct:

• Ideological imperative: Marxist-Leninist belief in the inevitable conflict between capitalism and socialism

• Historical insecurity: Russia's vulnerability to invasion and desire for territorial buffers

• Regime legitimation: The need for external enemies to justify domestic repression

• Expansionist opportunism: Exploiting weaknesses in the capitalist world

The Containment Strategy

Kennan's solution, later elaborated in his 1947 "X Article" in Foreign Affairs was containment:

Crucially, Kennan believed that Soviet expansionism could be "contained" without general war. He argued that the Soviet system contained internal contradictions that would eventually cause its collapse if prevented from expanding. This patient, long-term strategy contrasted with more aggressive "rollback" approaches advocated by some Republicans.

Less than two weeks after Kennan's Long Telegram, Winston Churchill delivered his famous "Sinews of Peace" address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. With President Truman on the platform beside him, the former Prime Minister issued a clarion call that publicly defined the emerging division of Europe.

Reception and Impact

Churchill's speech was controversial. Former Vice President Henry Wallace condemned it as a call to war. The New York Times initially criticized its confrontational tone. But the "Iron Curtain" metaphor, borrowed from Joseph Goebbels's propaganda, captured the public imagination and entered permanent usage.

The speech signaled a fundamental shift in Western policy. Churchill explicitly called for a "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples", a military alliance between the United States, British Commonwealth, and (implicitly) Western Europe against Soviet expansion. This was the intellectual foundation for NATO.

Soviet Reaction

Stalin responded personally in an interview with Pravda on March 14, 1946. He denounced Churchill as a "warmonger" and defender of British imperialism, comparing him to Hitler in his racial theories of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Stalin insisted that Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was necessary for security and had been agreed upon at Yalta and Potsdam.

The Truman Doctrine transformed Kennan's theoretical containment into official American policy. On March 12, 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress to request $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, nations facing communist insurgency and Soviet pressure.

The Greek Crisis

Britain had supported the Greek government against communist-led insurgents since 1944, but the collapsing British economy forced London to announce on February 21, 1947, that aid would end within six weeks. This "scissors crisis", the simultaneous expansion of Soviet power and contraction of British influence, created an vacuum that Washington felt compelled to fill.

Global Implications

Truman's speech framed the conflict in stark ideological terms, freedom versus totalitarianism, that would define American Cold War rhetoric for decades. The request for Greece and Turkey became a universal principle applicable worldwide. As Senator Arthur Vandenberg advised Truman: "Mr. President, the only way you are going to get what you want is to make a speech and scare the hell out of the country."

Congress approved the aid, and the Truman Doctrine became the cornerstone of American foreign policy. It established the precedent that the United States would intervene globally against communist expansion, a dramatic departure from traditional American isolationism.

Less than three months after the Truman Doctrine, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced a far more ambitious program at Harvard University's commencement. The European Recovery Program, universally known as the Marshall Plan, offered American economic aid to rebuild war-torn Europe, with profound political implications.

Marshall's Proposal

Marshall's speech was deliberately vague on details, inviting European nations to develop their own recovery plans. But the Secretary made clear that this was not merely humanitarian aid:

The Soviet Response

Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov initially showed interest, bringing an 89-person delegation to the Paris conference in June 1947. But Soviet leaders concluded that American aid would require opening their economy to Western inspection and influence, unacceptable conditions for a totalitarian regime. In July, Molotov walked out, denouncing the plan as an American scheme to dominate Europe.

The Soviet Union then prevented Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other Eastern European states from participating. This division—Western Europe accepting American aid, Eastern Europe refusing it, hardened the continent's split. The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), established in September 1947, formally united communist parties under Soviet direction.

Scale and Impact

Between 1948 and 1952, the United States provided $13.3 billion (approximately $150 billion in 2024 dollars) to 16 Western European nations. The aid required recipients to reduce trade barriers, adopt market-oriented policies, and cooperate with each other, creating the economic foundation for European integration.

• Wartime Alliance: The US and USSR were allies for only 3 years and 9 months (June 1941-May 1945), shorter than their subsequent Cold War confrontation.

• Yalta's Ambiguity: The "Declaration on Liberated Europe" promised free elections but used vague language that Stalin and the West interpreted differently.

• Truman's Inexperience: Harry Truman had been Vice President for only 82 days before becoming President; he met Stalin for the first time at Potsdam.

• Atomic Secrecy: The Soviet Union knew about the atomic bomb through espionage before Truman mentioned it to Stalin at Potsdam.

• Churchill's Warning: Churchill sent Truman a "iron curtain" memo in May 1945—ten months before his famous speech.

• Kennan's Length: The "Long Telegram" was 5,540 words, so long that it required multiple transmissions and annoyed the State Department telegraph staff.

• Greek Civil War: The immediate trigger for the Truman Doctrine was Britain's inability to continue aid to Greece, announced just three weeks before Truman's speech.

• Marshall's Audience: The Marshall Plan was announced at Harvard's commencement to a crowd that included few policymakers, most learned of it from newspaper reports.

• Soviet Interest: Molotov initially brought 89 officials to Paris to discuss Marshall Plan participation before Stalin ordered withdrawal.

• Czechoslovak Coup: The final communist takeover in Czechoslovakia (February 1948) occurred after the Marshall Plan was announced, accelerating Western European cooperation.

• Public Opinion: In 1945, 54% of Americans believed the US could cooperate with the Soviet Union; by 1946, only 35% held this view.

• Containment's Author: George Kennan later disavowed the militarized containment that emerged, believing he had advocated political and economic measures rather than military buildup.